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The paper proposes a critical appraisal of the possibility of transposing the national margin of 
appreciation doctrine as developed in the ECtHR case law to the WTO dispute settlement system on 
the one hand and to investor-State arbitration on the other. For that purpose, the analysis first 
establishes the difference between the doctrine and the concept of national margin of appreciation 
which takes into account many situations that would otherwise be misleading. The paper then looks at 
the functional nature of the doctrine within the case law of the ECtHR to conclude that it acts as a 
“softener” of the otherwise stringent proportionality analysis test. While the observation of the case 
law in WTO and international investment law shows that there is currently little room for the 
transposition of the doctrine to these areas, the paper looks at possible theoretical explanations for 
such a state of the law which seems to be due to both structural differences and political contingencies.  
Keywords 
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Over the last years, there has been considerable debate around the national margin of appreciation 
doctrine and the way it could be applied to other fields than the law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in which it first appeared. Some scholars have even pled in favour of an extension of 
this tool to all international dispute settlement systems
1
. More recently, it is in the fields of 
international investment and WTO dispute settlement systems that the question has arisen. However, 
while the views are more or less contrasted, the literature does not always seem to refer to the same 
object when referring to ‘margin of appreciation’. This is why the discussion around the possible 
transposition of the national margin of appreciation doctrine must start with a clarification of the 
different meanings of the expression. They can be boiled down to the concept of the margin of 
appreciation on the one hand and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation on the other. As a concept, 
it refers to the idea of leeway, discretion or space for manoeuvre that is granted by the normative 
structure of the law, i.e. its texture
2
, to any entity responsible for the enforcement of the law, be it the 
judge, the State or an international organization. In this sense, the margin of appreciation is not 
necessarily ‘national’ since it can also be the margin of appreciation of a judge or of an international 
institution. In this sense also, the concept can be used for any type of norm as long as its content is 
flexible. Thus, the ‘like products’ rule within international trade law (notably article III GATT) for 
instance is sufficiently flexible to call for a margin of appreciation by the judge, just as Article 41 of 
the UN Charter leaves a certain margin of appreciation to the Security Council to determine what 
constitutes a threat to international peace. In fact, this margin of appreciation is intimately related to 
the indetermination of legal norms. The more indeterminate the norm is, the wider the margin of 
appreciation that is left to the judge but also to the primary addressee of the norm, i.e. the State in most 
cases. As such, the margin of appreciation is common to all legal systems. It is thus not surprising that 
some scholars argue that the margin of appreciation technique is either applied or to be applied by all 
international judges
3
. What they probably refer to is not the doctrine of the national margin of 
appreciation but the concept of discretion that is inherent in any law and which is tightly related to the 
indetermination of the law. Indeed, it is not the doctrine but the concept of margin of appreciation 
which, as some put it, ‘introduces a degree of flexibility into the operation of the law’4 or ‘normative 
flexibility’5.  
This paper aims to show that the concept of margin of appreciation must be distinguished from the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation which will be called ‘national margin of appreciation’ (NMA) 
even though the ECtHR generally uses the wording ‘margin of appreciation’ without having to qualify 
it as ‘national’. Whereas the ‘concept’ evokes the margin of appreciation in a broad sense, the 
doctrine, as an articulated set of principles
6
, refers to the margin of appreciation stricto sensu. 
Therefore, it can be argued that any legal actor has a certain margin of appreciation (as a concept) 
when they interpret the law or legally characterize the facts of a given situation, but only States benefit 
from the margin of appreciation doctrine before an international tribunal. Whereas the concept 
conveys the idea of discretion in an abstract way, the doctrine always appears as related to a specific 
context as will be seen more in detail in the last part of the paper. It is well-known that, although its 
                                                     
1
 Y. Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EJIL 907 (2005) 
2
 H. L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, 1961, 120-132. 
3
 Y. Shany, op. cit. 
4
 JP Cot, ‘Margin of appreciation’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 1.  
5
 J. Lagomarsino, ‘WTO dispute settlement and sustainable development: legitimacy through holistic treaty interpretation’, 
Pace Environmental Law Review (2011)  
6
 JP Cot, op. cit. Note however that the author dismisses the characterization of doctrine and opts for that of ‘standard of 
review’.  
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roots may be traced to diverse techniques in different national legal systems
7
, the national margin of 
appreciation doctrine was created by the ECtHR in a very specific legal (and political) context
8
. The 
recent introduction of the NMA doctrine into the preamble of the European Convention for Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by Protocol 15 confirms that what is at issue is more than the 
concept of discretion inherent to the application of any type of law
9
. And if it is to be taken as a 
comparative tool, it is important to keep in mind the judicial evolution of the doctrine as well as its 
legal and political context.  
Within WTO law, the search for the NMA doctrine as understood in this paper will center on the 
necessity tests of articles XX GATT and XIV GATS, thus excluding areas such as that of ‘like 
products’ or anti-dumping measures where it could be said that a sort of margin of appreciation 
appears in favour of the States given the indeterminate nature of such norms. These areas would fall 
under the concept of margin of appreciation rather than the doctrine. Besides, while the standard of 
review provided for by Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement could well be compared to the 
margin of appreciation as understood within the ECtHR, the ‘greater margin of deference to the 
Member’s anti-dumping determination’10 is explicitly provided for by the Agreement itself and is not 
left to the appreciation of the dispute settlement body as within the ECHR
11
. However, although the 
necessity test appears also in other WTO agreements, the present study does not proceed to an 
exhaustive account of all the occurrences of the necessity test within WTO case law. The analysis will 
thus be limited to those included in the aforementioned Articles XX of GATT and XIV of GATS. 
Indeed, these two provisions bear the closest resemblance to the exceptions provided for in the ECHR 
law, as they imply a balancing of conflicting interests, and not simply analyzing indeterminate and 
therefore flexible norms.  
As for investment protection law, since there are no general treaty provisions which could be 
previously identified and compared to Article XX GATT, it will be necessary to start the analysis with 
an identification of any rules providing for a necessity test which could give rise to a balance of the 
restriction of an investor’s rights with a public interest objective of the State.  
Before screening the relevant case law of the WTO and of investment tribunals in search of any 
reference or room for reference to the NMA doctrine, attention will first be paid to the doctrine as it 
functions within the ECtHR case law (part I). Tightly tied to that limited scope, this paper does not 
attempt to argue in favor (or against) the generalization of the NMA doctrine, but simply observes the 
existing law so as to examine whether there exists anything close to the NMA doctrine in WTO and 
international investment case law, and concludes on the absence of the NMA within the examined case 
law (part II). Part III aims at accounting for the observed state of law by determining the underlying 
principles which found the NMA doctrine and then examining whether said principles might be 
adapted to international economic law dispute settlement systems. Although this last part could prima 
facie be taken as a plea for discarding the relevance of the NMA doctrine regarding international 
economic law, the approach is not normative but analytical.  
                                                     
7
 For instance, French scholars tend to see its origin in French administrative law which provides, in certain cases, for a 
wide margin of appreciation in favour of the administration.  
8
 It is the very famous Handyside case in which the doctrine appeared for the first time (Handyside v UK, 1 EHRR 737 
(1976). See infra part I.  
9
 Protocol 15 adopted on 24 June 2013 adds a new recital to the preamble: ‘Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in 
this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention’.  
10
 The phrase is not used as such in the dispute settlement reports but it can be found in the explantory pages dealing with 
the standard of review on the WTO web site.  
11
 The fact that the NMA has been introduced into the text of the Convention does not change its originaly judicial nature.  
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I. The NMA at the ECtHR as a ‘softener’ of the proportionality analysis  
The aim here is to look at the legal context of the NMA doctrine within the case law of the ECtHR in 
order to determine its functioning and its relationship with another central principle, ie the principle of 
proportionality.  
The Handyside v UK judgment is the first case in which the ECtHR resorted to the NMA 
explicitly
12. The Court had to assess whether the judicial measures taken against Mr Handyside’s 
book, namely the seizure and destruction of all the copies of the Little Red Schoolbook, were 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ to protect public morals. And it is within this assessment of 
necessity that the NMA doctrine slipped in. In other words, the NMA tool was used when it came to 
balancing different elements that had been taken into consideration by the government. The Court had 
to balance a fundamental freedom, the freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR), and a collective 
goal, the protection of morals.  
The NMA has thus appeared in relation to Articles 8-11 ECHR which have in common a second 
paragraph allowing for restrictions to the protected rights. However, this same doctrine plays an 
important role in relation to other substantive provisions of the Convention which do not have the 
same normative structure. To give but a few examples, even though their wording does not explicitly 
refer to a necessity test, Articles 6, 14 and 15 of the Convention as well as Article 1 of Protocol 1 
entail a balancing exercise between the legitimate aim sought by the defendant Government and the 
means to achieving it. In all these cases the measures restricting the protected right must be duly 
justified. There must be a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality’.  
And wherever there is proportionality analysis, there is room for lowering that standard of review 
through the NMA doctrine. Indeed, the relationship between the proportionality analysis and the NMA 
doctrine is an issue of standard of review. The ‘normal’ standard of review before the ECtHR is that of 
proportionality analysis seen as a strict scrutiny test. As such, that test is commonly said to be 
composed of three sub-tests: suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu
13
. This 
presentation of the proportionality analysis being mainly scholarly, the Court does not distinguish 
between the three stages and it most of the time focuses on the last step. The proportionality stricto 
sensu step is the balancing between the means chosen and the legitimate aim that is pursued. Within 
the European human rights law, it is this step ‘that has played a decisive role in constraining the 
discretion that national authorities exercise’14. And it is to moderate this limitation of the States’ 
discretion that the NMA doctrine has been introduced by the Court. In that regard, the wording of the 
Court may be misleading in that its proportionality analysis is referred to as the ‘reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized’15. In 
some cases, the Court refers to this test as a ‘fair balance’ that must be ‘struck between the demands of 
the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights’16. This wording might seem to indicate a deferential standard of review, 
particularly if one relates it to the Wednesbury unreasonableness test in English administrative law
17
 or 
                                                     
12
 Handyside v UK, 1 EHRR 737 (1976). 
13
 On the three elements of the proportionality analysis, see J. Jans, 'Proportionality Revisited', 27 LIEI (2000): 239, 240-41. 
Even though Jans’ analysis dealt mainly with EC law, it may be transposed to the proportionality analysis more 
generally. 
14
 D. Shelton, The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, ‘Proportionality Analysis by the European Court 
of Human Rights’, 2013, 464.  
15
 James v UK, judgment of 21 February 1986, § 50. Our highlight. Kozacioglu v Turkey, judgment of 19 February 2009, § 
63. Our emphasis.  
16
 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, § 69 
17
 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947)2 All ER 680 
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the American ‘rational basis review’18 which seem to be the lowest and most lenient standards of 
review in those systems. These two standards are usually opposed to stricter standards of review such 
as ‘strict scrutiny’ in American law or ‘proportionality’ analysis in English law. And yet, the 
‘reasonable relationship’ test before the ECtHR is a very intrusive standard of review. Indeed, the 
ECtHR proves to be an international judge who applies a very intrusive standard of review of the 
action of its Member States.  
However, while usually applying quite a strict proportionality test, the ECtHR proves to be 
reluctant regarding another test which is often linked to the necessity test and which, as we will see, 
plays a central role in the WTO dispute settlement system, ie the ‘least restrictive means’ (LRM) test. 
According to this test, the State has to adopt the least right-restrictive measure and make sure that 
there are no less restrictive alternatives which could be adopted instead of the envisaged one. The 
ECHtR considers such a test to be too encroaching on State sovereignty. It therefore appears unwilling 
to assign too much weight to it in its balancing exercise. In property cases, which can be best 
compared to trade rights since they involve a right which has an economic dimension, it seems that the 
Court squares the LRM test with a too stringent necessity test which it considers not to be inherent in 
Article 1 of Protocol 1. In James v UK the applicants argued that the measure was to be considered as 
not necessary (only) because there arguably existed an alternative less restrictive measure but the 
Court rejected that approach and took the LRM test as one factor among others in assessing whether a 
‘fair balance’ was struck19. In other words, the sole existence of alternative less restrictive measures is 
not decisive in itself and it has to be balanced with other factors. Therefore, the standard of review 
applied by the ECtHR is a strict one but it could be stricter if the Court systematically drew a final 
conclusion from the existence of less restrictive alternatives as it did quite exceptionally in Saint-Paul 
Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg
20
. When the Court does take the LRM test into account, it hardly ever 
treats it as a self-standing test but rather as a factor among others in an overall assessment of 
necessity
21
. Besides, the cases in which the Court refuses to take into account the existence of a less 




However, even without the LRM test or with a minored LRM test, proportionality analysis remains 
a stringent standard of review. This is the reason why the Court has had to develop a more lenient test 
corresponding to the NMA doctrine. While the NMA may appear as an alternative standard of review, 
the Court determines on a case by case basis which issues must be submitted to the strict scrutiny 
standard – proportionality analysis – and which must be reviewed through this more lenient test. It has 
nevertheless attempted a rationalization of the doctrine through the establishment of criteria that are 
taken into account in determining whether the NMA doctrine must apply in a particular case. These 
criteria – mainly the importance of the protected right, the existence of a European consensus, the 
nature of the interest to be protected by the interference and the nature of the interference –, are vague 
enough to grant great flexibility to the European judge on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, lowering 
the scrutiny does not mean giving up the balancing vocabulary characterizing the proportionality 
analysis. The Court refers to the same ‘reasonable relationship’ both in cases in which it invokes the 
NMA doctrine and in cases in which it applies proportionality analysis. The difference between the 
two tests lies not in a distinct methodology but only in that the Court accepts in the first case that the 
State give more weight than itself or another Member State would to its legitimate aim as long as there 
                                                     
18
 In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), although the Act is struck down, the majority and the dissent agrees ‘that 
“rational basis” - the normal test for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause - is the governing standard’. 
19
 James and others v UK, § 51.  
20
 18 April 2013,  
21
 See the prisoners’ case: Campbell v UK, judgment of 25 December 1992, §§ 52-53; and also the discriminatory treatment 
of homosexual cases, for ex. Smith and Grady, judgment of 27 September 1999, § 102.  
22
 Rasmussen v Denmark, judgment of 28 November 1984, § 41.  
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is a balancing; whereas in the second case the Court itself proceeds to the balancing substituting its 
view for that of the national authorities. Therefore, it may be said that it is the way the standard of 
review is implemented rather than the standard itself which makes the difference. It thus appears that 
before the ECtHR the standard of review is always the same, but the actual applied test is different. 
This enhances the political character of the NMA doctrine
23
 since it is not an independent standard of 
review but a variation of a unique ‘reasonableness’ – or proportionality – standard of review the 
application of which depends on the facts of each case.  
Proportionality analysis and NMA doctrine are often presented as ‘tandem doctrines’24. The NMA 
doctrine is also described as ‘the other side of the principle of proportionality’25. However, that does 
not explain the nature of that relationship. In that regard, the proportionality analysis is often seen as 
something that is added, or that completes, the NMA doctrine. Hence, according to Judge Matscher, 
‘the principle of proportionality is ‘corrective and restrictive of the margin of appreciation’26. 
Similarly, Judge Spielmann considers the principle of proportionality as ‘probably the most important 
– and perhaps even decisive – factor’ that impacts the margin of appreciation27. These positions 
assume that what is central is the NMA doctrine and that its functioning will depend on the principle 
of proportionality. Thus the proportionality analysis would be a factor acting on the NMA doctrine.  
It is here argued that the principle of proportionality and NMA doctrine may be articulated the 
other way around. The principle of proportionality could well be what is central and the NMA doctrine 
what is ‘added’ in cases where deference towards a State’s acts seems appropriate. This is backed up 
by the fact that proportionality is what is common to all cases before the ECtHR whereas the NMA 
doctrine is relied on only in certain cases. Indeed, the NMA doctrine is not inherent to the nature of the 
obligations binding upon the Member States of the ECtHR. In other words, the NMA does not appear 
wherever there is a balancing between individual rights and collective interests. Therefore, the NMA 
doctrine rather seems to act as a ‘softener’ of the proportionality analysis. 
II. Looking for the NMA doctrine in investment and WTO law  
The practice of the WTO dispute settlement bodies and that of the international investment tribunals 
will be examined to search for anything that resembles the NMA doctrine. The case law suggests that 
none of these fields of international economic law seems to welcome the NMA doctrine as it exists 
before the ECtHR.  
A. No NMA doctrine without an admitted proportionality analysis: the case of the WTO  
Some scholars seem to identify recourse by the WTO panels or the Appellate Body (AB) to the NMA 
doctrine
28
. However, in doing so they interpret the case law more than they rely on explicit excerpts of 
reports. Other scholars who argue for a generalization of the NMA doctrine have found only two 
                                                     
23
 Infra Part III.  
24
 D. Shelton, op.cit., 456.  
25
 Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the 
ECHR, Intersentia, 2002, 14. 
26
 ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’, (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht; London 1993) 79. 
27
 ‘Allowing the Right Margin: the European Court of Human Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine – 
Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review’ (Centre for European Studies Working Paper Series, Cambridge 2012) 22.  
28
 H. Ruiz Fabri and P. Monnier, ‘Chronique de règlement des différends’, Journal du droit international 2004/3 and 
Journal du droit international 2014/3.; more generally but mentioning the case of the WTO dispute settlement reports 
and relying on the former reference, M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism, Oxford, 2009, 45; Howse, R. and Tuerk, E., 
‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations – A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute’, p. 283 in G. de Burca 
and J. Scott (eds), The EU and WTO: Constitutional and Legal Aspects, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001, 325. 
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references to the margin of appreciation within the WTO case law
29
. However, these uses are due not 
to the panels or the AB themselves but to arbitral panels convened under Article 22(6) of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) in disputes concerning the appropriateness of retaliatory 
countermeasures in response to noncompliance with prior panel and AB reports
30
. Whereas it is 
asserted that this example ‘clearly echoes the ECtHR's approach to the margin of appreciation’31, it is 
here submitted that they do not have much in common. The arbitrators have used the concept, not the 
doctrine. Indeed, within the context of the retaliatory countermeasures, it is not the necessity but the 
appropriateness of the retaliatory measures that is at issue. Whereas this reference to the concept 
certainly shows deference for the defending State’s assessment, this deference does not replace the 
proportionality analysis. It intervenes in a context where it is expected that the States have more 
leeway since they are retaliating against a persistent violation of the WTO agreements. Proceeding to a 
strict scrutiny review of the appropriateness of their retaliatory measures would amount to depriving 
the Members from this alternative to compliance that is provided by the DSU.  
And the unwillingness of the WTO bodies to borrow the doctrine of the NMA is to be induced 
from the fact that, besides these two examples, the use of the wording ‘margin of appreciation’ or 
anything close to it is carefully avoided in the reports. If there was not some sort of reluctance to 
import that tool one could come across if not the doctrine enshrined within a necessity analysis, at 
least the concept in some of the reports. That is not the case. Unlike some international investment 
tribunals, the WTO dispute settlement bodies are very cautious with any slip of the pen that could 
suggest that they are accepting in certain cases even the concept of margin of appreciation.  
The freedom to set the level of protection, the weighing and balancing and the LRM test are central 
to the standard of review used by the WTO bodies when assessing the necessity of a given national 
measure. In the absence of any explicit reference to the States’ margin of appreciation in the case law 
of the WTO, the possibility of a disguised NMA doctrine will be assessed through the lens of these 
three elements.  
a) A unique freedom to set the level of protection within the WTO  
According to a supposedly ‘cardinal’, or even ‘constitutional’ premise of the GATT system: WTO 
Member States are free to choose their own level of acceptable risk in their political economy – their 
so-called ‘regulatory autonomy’32. Articles XX of the GATT and XIV of the GATS are the provisions 
that provide the Member States with public order exceptions to the freedom of trade that is guaranteed 
in the two agreements. What limits the action of the Member States in that regard is that 1) the 
restrictive measures must be necessary to achieve the identified legitimate aim, 2) they must be non-
discriminatory and not arbitrary. The principle of the freedom to choose the level of protection allows 
a Member State to set a higher level of protection than that of other Member States and even a zero 
risk level of protection
33
 where the necessity test in itself would not necessarily have this effect. What 
this means is that contrary to what happens at the ECtHR, the level of protection chosen by the State 
                                                     
29
 Burke White and Von Staden, op. cit., 310-311. Decision by the Arbitrator, US--Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, §§ 4.16-.18, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007); Decision by the Arbitrators, 
EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas III, P 52, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000). 
30
 Note however that in Bananas the arbitrators are the original panelists.  
31
 W. W. Burke-White and A. von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: the Standard of Review in Investor-
State arbitrations’, YJIL (2010) 311.  
32
 J. H.H. Weiler, ‘Comment on Brazil – Retreated Tyres’, 8(1) World Trade Review 137 (2009), at 139; Meinhard Hilf, 
‘Power, Rules and Principles-Which Orientation for WTO/ GATT Law?’ 4(1) Journal of International Economic Law 
111 (2001), at 118. 
33
 The freedom to choose the level of protection is cross-cutting in all WTO law and is particularly present in SPS 
Agreement cases. See European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, 
Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001. 
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will not necessarily be faced with other levels of protection set by other States. Thus, in United States 
– Gambling, the AB stressed, regarding Article XIV a), that Member States ‘should be given some 
scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts of “public morals”…in their respective 
territories, according to their own systems and scales of values’34. Equally, in the Brazil – Retreaded 
Tyres, the AB concluded on the necessity analysis that ‘the fundamental principle is the right that 
WTO Members have to determine the level of protection that they consider appropriate in a given 
context’35.  
The freedom to set the level of protection seems to run counter to the very idea of any strict 
proportionality analysis within the WTO. And since the NMA doctrine maps onto the strict 
proportionality analysis, it seems to be thereby dismissed. Indeed, while the ECtHR explicitly admits 
that it balances the restrictive State measures against the aim pursued, the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies reject any idea of balancing the aim itself against the measures. Of course the balancing 
technique is present in their reasoning as we will see further but it is not openly admitted that the aim 
that the State has decided to pursue will be balanced against the restrictions to trade. This freedom of 
States to set their level of protection does not have an equivalent in the ECtHR case law where what is 
openly looked for is a balance between the restrictive measures and the legitimate aim pursued. When 
the Court says that it balances the measures against the aim that means that it may consider that the 
aim is not worth the measures. In other words, the Court may well come to the conclusion that the aim 
is not weighty enough to allow the restrictive measures. In that case, the Court questions the level of 
protection that the State has chosen.  
However, that freedom is not as sacred as it may seem within the WTO law system. Thus, if a State 
opts for a zero level protection but it does not manage to prove that the risk is sufficiently established, 
it somehow loses the right to choose its own level of protection
36
. And also, if the defendant chooses a 
‘silly’ aim or level of protection, its ‘relative importance will be discounted in the balancing test’37. 
This is because the dispute settlement bodies allow themselves to assess within the balancing exercise 
the importance of the specific value that is put forward by the Member State. In this sense, the 
balancing exercise gets very close to that used by the ECtHR which also takes into account the 
importance of the value involved when assessing the necessity of a measure. And while the ECtHR 
exercise is seen as a test of proportionality stricto sensu, the WTO organs do not admit directly 
balancing the aim pursued with the restrictive effects of the challenged measure. The balancing 
exercise is very carefully presented as part of the LRM test which corresponds to the necessity sub-test 
within the proportionality analysis. This position is consistent with the principle of the free level of 
protection which seems to rule out, at least theoretically, an assessment of proportionality stricto 
sensu
38
. Indeed, whereas the first (suitability) and second (necessity) sub-tests of the principle of 
proportionality are not problematic, the third (proportionality stricto sensu) would imply that, beyond 
the question of their necessity, the restrictive measures are balanced against the chosen level of 
protection. In other words, the panels and the AB would have to answer the question whether the set 
level of protection is worth the trade restrictive effects of a given measure. And in finding that the 
measure is not proportionate, they would be questioning the chosen level of protection and asking the 
State to lower it by adopting less trade restrictive measures.  
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Despite what seems now a slip of the pen in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres39, the AB has clarified this point 
and dismissed any doubts or fears that the United States had on a disguised recourse by the panel to 
the strict proportionality balancing. Indeed, in the China – Publications and Audiovisual Products 
case, the United States challenged the fact that the panel adopted a two-step approach according to 
which it first checked the necessity of the measure taking into account a variety of factors such as the 
importance of the value at stake, the nature of the restriction etc. and then, after it drew an 
intermediate finding that the measure was necessary, it checked whether there were other less 
restrictive alternatives. Invoking the confusion that the two-step approach brought about, the US 
feared that the test would go beyond necessity to reach strict proportionality analysis. The AB made it 
clear that it is a single process which leads to one conclusion, ie the necessity of the measure
40
. It is in 
the analysis of the necessity criterion that it does the balancing and not after. Even though it was not 
put so bluntly, the fear of the United States was that once a measure is considered necessary, it could 
still be considered disproportionate. 
b) A different weighing and balancing  
There undeniably is weighing and balancing within both systems. The question is whether it is the 
same factors that are weighed and balanced and whether the function of that exercise is the same in 
both systems.  
The factors that are weighed and balanced in the ECtHR cases are the importance of the protected 
right, the European consensus, the nature of the interest to be protected by the interference (its 
objectivity and weight) and the nature of the interference. Whereas the nature of the interest is the 
equivalent of the ‘relative importance of the values’ of the WTO and the nature of the interference is 
nothing other than the restrictive effects factor of the WTO, the importance of the protected right and 
the European consensus factors do not have an equivalent within the WTO system. 
Regarding the protected right, there cannot be any equivalent since all the rights that are protected 
within the WTO law fall under one category, the freedom of trade. 
As for the European consensus, the lack of equivalent must be clearly defined because, 
theoretically, nothing prevents the dispute settlement bodies from having recourse to that concept, 
mutatis mutandis. They could well refer to an ‘international consensus’ on certain collective values. 
For instance, one could imagine that before declaring that a certain measure, adopted on grounds of 
the protection of public morals, is necessary, the WTO body might search for an international, or even 
regional, consensus. However, that would run counter the above mentioned principle of free choice of 
the level of protection
41
. That would somehow objectivize the control. This objectivization is admitted 
and accepted within the ECHR system but not within the WTO system. There are of course cases in 
which the WTO bodies come to the conclusion that a national measure is not necessary to protect a 
given legitimate objective, but that is generally because there are other less restrictive measures, not 
because there is an international consensus on the protection of the right or value at stake as in the 
European human rights law.  
It is undeniable that the scope of the application of the necessity test was outlined and reduced to a 
LRM test in the United States – Section 337 case42, and furthermore the Korea – Beef case has detailed 
the factors that are to be balanced to assess the necessity of a restrictive measure: the relative 
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importance of the common interests or values at stake, the extent to which the measure contributes to 
the realization of the end pursued, and the extent to which the compliance measure produces restrictive 
effects on international commerce
43
. While these factors may suggest that the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies apply a proportionality analysis similar to that applied by the ECtHR, the AB adds shortly after 
that the weighing and balancing process is comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-
consistent alternative measure which the Member concerned could ‘reasonably be expected to employ’ 
is available, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is ‘reasonably available’44. Slightly different 
is the approach of the panel that has been upheld by the AB in the China – Audiovisual products: the 
weighing and balancing plays a role in both sequences of the necessity appraisal. The different factors 
are first assessed regarding the challenged measure, and then they are assessed regarding the proposed 
alternative measures
45
. Therefore, the function of the weighing and balancing is again to determine 
whether a less restrictive alternative exists. In contrast, the ‘weighing and balancing’ of the different 
factors by the ECtHR is part of its overall necessity appraisal which we have seen leaves little room 
for the LRM test. Therefore, the weighing and balancing has a different function in the two systems.  
c) A stricter ‘least restrictive means’ test 
According to J. Weiler, ‘[t]he LRM family derives from, and is meant to be respectful’ of the freedom 
of the Member States to set their own level of protection
46
. However, whereas the freedom to 
determine the level of protection seems protected at least as a matter of principle within the WTO case 
law, States’ freedom of action appears to be seriously restricted through the LRM test if we compare it 
with what happens within the ECtHR system. Indeed, whereas the test is familiar within the ECtHR 
case law, it has been shown that it is considered to be too restrictive to be used in a decisive way
47
.  
The LRM test is indeed an intrusive test although its definition by the WTO bodies leaves room for 
some flexibility. Examining the LRM test within the ECtHR, a scholar considers that ‘(r]eliance on 
this doctrine may be considered as one of the most stringent forms of proportionality appraisal’48. This 
may suggest that the test applied by the WTO is stricter than the AB seems to imply. Indeed, within 
the WTO case law, the LRM is not one factor among others, but it is the decisive factor. The existence 
of a less restrictive measure is not really weighed against other factors and this is the reason why it is 
sometimes examined separately from what is said to be the other part of the same process, ie the 
weighing and balancing of the other factors. There is no real weighing and balancing regarding the 
LRM test: if the applicant shows that there is an alternative measure which is less restrictive and 
reasonably available, the measure will be inconsistent, whatever the weight of the protected value or 
the extent of the restriction which are usually examined separately from the LRM test. Some however 
argue, quite convincingly, that there is some sort of strict proportionality analysis within the LRM test 
applied by the dispute settlement bodies
49
. But contrary to what could be expected, the decisive 
assessment of proportionality is not the one which is called ‘weighing and balancing’ of different 
factors but the one that lies in the ‘reasonable availability’ sub-test of the LRM test. Indeed, once it has 
identified the level of protection sought by the respondent, the dispute settlement body will assess 
whether there exist any less-trade restrictive alternative which is reasonably available. Even though the 
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test implies that a ‘reasonably alternative measure’ must not impose an ‘undue burden’50, the burden 
of proof lies with the responding State. Indeed, when the complaining party puts forward an 
alternative measure, it is up to the respondent to demonstrate that the measure is not ‘reasonably 
available’. However, while the necessity appraisal is here quite close to that of the ECtHR, it is not 
accompanied by any ‘softener’ comparable to the NMA before the ECtHR. Therefore, although it may 
be possible to assert the existence of a certain type of strict proportionality analysis within the 
‘reasonably available measure’ test, this must not be assimilated with the NMA doctrine. One could 
however imagine that if the NMA were to develop over time within the WTO dispute settlement 
system, it would probably find its place in this part of the reasoning.  
The AB’s methodology in which the existence or absence of a LRM is decisive and self-standing 
therefore contrasts clearly with the ECtHR’s use of the LRM test above described. This is made 
particularly obvious in the China – Audiovisual case in which the AB confirms the two-step 
methodology of the panel: the other factors that can make the challenged measure necessary are first 
balanced in a provisional appraisal of necessity; and then, the panel moves on to examine, separately, 
whether there is any alternative measure which is reasonably available
51
. Therefore, even though the 
ECtHR openly applies proportionality analysis, ie proportionality stricto sensu, and the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies do not, at least explicitly, the above observations show that the test applied by the 
AB is far stricter than the one of the ECtHR.  
We may thus draw the same conclusion from two paradoxical observations. On the one hand, the 
‘mantra’52 of the freedom to set their level of protection is so prevalent in the discourse of the panels 
and the AB that there is no room for a NMA doctrine which would come as a softener of a stricter test. 
The WTO dispute settlement bodies do not recognize that they resort to the proportionality analysis 
stricto sensu in which the aim sought to be realized is balanced directly with the restrictive effect of 
the challenged measure
53
. Thus, as long as it is not admitted that the WTO dispute bodies proceed to a 
proportionality analysis similar to the one used by the ECtHR and that in this context they admit to 
balance values, it is unlikely that there will ever be any room for the NMA doctrine in cases where this 
assessment of values is deemed too sensitive politically. On the other hand, the prevalence of the LRM 
test in the WTO dispute settlement bodies’ methodology and the incompatibility of this test with the 
NMA doctrine in the ECtHR case law equally show that there is currently little room for such a 
doctrine within the WTO system.  
B. No NMA doctrine within the necessity test in investment arbitration 
Whereas the WTO dispute settlement bodies are very cautious in their wording, investment tribunals 
seem to be more adventurous. Indeed, while the former are bound by fairly homogenous substantive 
provisions within the WTO treaties, as well as a certain procedural discipline
54
, it is not the case of the 
latter mainly because of their multiplicity and diversity, but also because there is no common appeal 
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. Hence, whereas the WTO dispute settlement bodies carefully abstain from using the wording 
‘margin of appreciation’ to avoid any misunderstanding or expectation on behalf of the Member 
States, investment tribunals refer from time to time to the NMA ‘word’. However, it appears on 
further examination that in most cases at issue it is not the doctrine but the concept of margin of 
appreciation that is really referred to. And that is the case even where the tribunal refers to the case 
law of the ECtHR. Before looking at the case law, it is necessary to further define what rules within 
international investment law could allow for the use of the NMA doctrine.  
1) Investment protection rules that could welcome the NMA doctrine  
Whereas in the WTO law, particularly within the limited scope of the GATT and the GATS, it is fairly 
straightforward to presume at what stage of the legal reasoning the NMA doctrine could be invoked, 
things are less obvious in the case of investment law. This is mainly due to the diversity of the 
applicable law which is based on a wide array of individual treaties. The question is therefore whether 
there exists within these disparate provisions anything similar to Article XX of the GATT. Whereas 
the vague wording of most international investment rules can justify the use of the concept of margin 
of appreciation, only some very specific rules could potentially welcome the doctrine as defined 
previously. Some authors have drawn conclusions concerning the appropriateness
56
 or lack of 
appropriateness
57
 of the recourse to the NMA doctrine by arbitral tribunals, but none seem to have 
precisely identified which rules of investment protection law are involved. Whereas their analysis 
usually focuses on the language of the arbitral tribunals, the point here is rather to start from the 
investment rules or principles which would be similar to those allowing for the NMA doctrine within 
the ECtHR case law. 
Not all rules containing a public interest condition allow for a (at least theoretical) recourse to the 
NMA doctrine
58
. Only those which give rise to a balancing between public interest and private rights 
are relevant.  
a) General exceptions  
BITs have always provided for exception clauses. Some of these have been applied in certain disputes.  
To start with, one needs to clarify the debate on necessity by stating where in investment law the 
NMA doctrine cannot be imported. Within international investment law, the issue of necessity has 
been widely discussed in the aftermath of the Argentinean cases resulting from the 2001 financial 
crisis. Some authors have suggested that the tribunals should adopt a NMA test instead of the ‘no other 
means available’ test used in early awards concerning Argentina59. However, the ‘no other means 
available’ test cannot be compared with the necessity test developed by the ECtHR because it applies 
within the state of necessity as a rule of customary international law. Moreover, setting the debate in 
terms of standard of review is not specific enough and it does not allow for instance to distinguish 
between the standard of review that is imposed by a given rule – as the only means available test – and 
the standard of review which is freely chosen by the adjudicator – as the national margin of 
appreciation or the proportionality analysis which are both encompassed in the same rule. Therefore, 
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once the Tribunal has decided, rightly or wrongly, to rely on the customary principle of necessity 
rather than on the treaty rule of Article XI of the US – Argentina BIT for instance60, it has no 
discretion as to the standard of review applicable because the ‘no other means available’ test is set by 
Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts
61
. This 
standard of review is very high since the ILC made it clear that the plea of necessity ‘is excluded if 
there are other (otherwise lawful) means available, even if they may be more costly or less 
convenient’62. Be that as it may, the issue of the state of necessity falls outside the scope of this 
analysis. Therefore, as far as the Argentinean cases are concerned, the only awards that could give rise 
to a recourse to the NMA doctrine are the ones which apply the treaty rule providing for the possibility 
for the host State not to guarantee investment protection in case of risk to public security, public order 
etc.  
General exceptions such as that of Article XI of the US – Argentina BIT tend to be applicable to all 
substantive rules included in the treaty. They generally provide the host State with the possibility to 
take measures that are necessary, for instance, to the ‘the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment 
of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or 
the Protection of its own essential security interests’63. Whilst still rare, there is a steady trend towards 
the protection of public interest through these general exceptions in treaty drafting
64
. Thus, among the 
most recent trend, one may note Article 22.1 (General Exceptions) of the Australia-Korea FTA which 
is related to the chapter on investment
65
. This provision contains an exception that ‘is modeled, to a 
degree, on WTO exceptions provisions such as GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV’66. Article 
10 of the Canadian Model BIT provides for a similar ‘general exception’. It is not the purpose here to 
list and analyze all these exceptions which are very diverse and which can be more or less similar to 
those of the ECtHR or of the WTO agreements. Suffice it to say that all these treaty exceptions have 
the same normative structure: they all allow for the adoption of measures which are restrictive of the 
investments protection as long as they are necessary for a legitimate objective. And that is where the 
comparison can be drawn with Articles 8-11 of the ECHR. It is in this assessment of the necessity of 
the measures that investment tribunals could follow the path of the ECtHR and allow, in some cases, 
for a wide margin of appreciation of the host State.  
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b) Specific exceptions  
Specific exceptions are those that are attached to a specific substantive rule. Although all the 
substantive rules usually contained in the BITs can be qualified by these public interest exceptions, we 
will mention only those concerning the expropriation rule and the indirect clauses, ie the clauses which 
provide for national treatment and treatment no less favorable. These are indeed the rules which are 
most frequently invoked in the disputes.  
Concerning the indirect clauses, there is an interesting example in the Protocol to the China – 
Germany BIT which provides that ‘[m]easures that have to be taken for reasons of public security and 
order, public health or morality shall not be deemed "treatment less favourable"’67. Whereas it does 
not include explicitly the necessity test, ‘have to be taken’ clearly conveys that only the measures 
which are necessary will be lawfully taken. The necessity assessment could therefore, theoretically, 
welcome the NMA doctrine.  
As for the expropriation clause, the use of the word ‘exception’ to characterize the provision that 
limits its scope may be disputed. What is referred to however is any provision that is introduced within 
the BIT to allow a host State to take expropriatory measures without having to comply with the 
expropriation rule which imposes strict conditions. In other words, we will see an exception to the 
expropriation rule wherever a BIT, explicitly or implicitly, provides for a distinction between an 
indirect expropriation and a regulatory measure. The US model of BIT is a good illustration and must 
be examined closely. Its Article 6 subjects any expropriation measure to four conditions which can be 
summarized as: a) public purpose, b) non-discrimination, c) compensation and d) due process. Then, 
Annex B adds an exception/distinction : ‘Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory 
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations’. Thus an indirect 
expropriatory measure will not be considered as such under two conditions: non-discrimination and 
legitimate public welfare objectives. The distinction is of the highest importance because an 
expropriation requires a fair market compensation while a lawful regulation allows no compensation 
whatsoever for the investor. What may be confusing is that these two conditions are very similar to 
two of the four conditions for the legality of an expropriation. Indeed, while the non-discrimination 
criterion is exactly the same, the public interest criterion of Article 6 is very close to the legitimate 
objectives of Annex B. A very similar wording is used by Annex B 13(1) of the Canadian Model BIT 
except that the latter does not qualify those non-discriminatory measures of ‘regulatory’. In the 
absence of any ‘necessity’ word in these two series of conditions, the question arises as to at what 
point a balancing between private rights and public interest might be introduced.  
A look at the case law of the ECtHR can be useful in this regard. Indeed, the structure of Article 1 
of Protocol 1 to the ECHR on the right to property is similar to the BIT provisions just examined. 
While the first paragraph subjects any deprivation of property to public interest and to other conditions 
provided by the law, the second paragraph allows the ‘[S]tate to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest’. In other words, the 
second paragraph provides for an exception to, among other things
68
, the protection against 
expropriation. As such, it provides for the same proportionality analysis as the one used in regards of 
Articles 8-11. According to an established case law of the ECtHR, ‘a measure depriving a person of 
his property [must] pursue (…) a legitimate aim ‘in the public interest’ and bear ‘a reasonable 
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relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized’69. It is 
therefore the necessity criterion of the second paragraph that calls for the balancing, not the ‘public 
interest’ condition of the first one. The case law shows that while this necessity could be subject to a 
strict scrutiny, the economic nature of the matters involved leads the Court to often recognize a wide 
margin of appreciation
70
. The Court considers that ‘in implementing social and economic policies the 
margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities in determining what is in the general 
interest of the community is a broad one’71.  
What this case law teaches regarding investment law is that it is not within the assessment of the 
legality of the expropriatory measure that the NMA doctrine could play a role. Thus, the fact that the 
rule on expropriation requires that the measure be taken in a public interest is not relevant here 
because in this case the public interest is not balanced against other factors. It is an indispensable 
condition among others on which the arbitrators usually use a very loose scrutiny standard. They 
usually show some sort of deference at this point, and it is when it comes to the cumulative criterion of 
compensation that the measure is most often found to be in breach of the Convention
72
. The 
proportionality analysis of the ECtHR could rather be borrowed when it comes to assessing whether a 
measure deserves or not the characterization of regulatory measure rather than that of indirect 
expropriation. Even though the BITs which make that distinction do not explicitly require that the 
measure be ‘necessary’ to achieve the legitimate public welfare objective, the idea of necessity is 
implicit.  
And yet, despite this possibility to follow the path of the ECtHR regarding the expropriation rule, 
investment arbitral tribunals have not really imported the NMA doctrine, at least not within the rule on 
expropriation. Except for the Methanex sentence which was very controversial and which did not 
exactly balance public objectives against private rights
73
, there are no instances in which the tribunals 
used the distinction provided for in the treaties in a manner similar to the practice of the ECtHR.  
2) NMA doctrine in investment protection case law  
Since we have highlighted the link between proportionality analysis and NMA doctrine before the 
ECtHR, the search for the latter within investment law may start with a review of the former. For the 
investment tribunals to be able to apply the NMA doctrine, they must in the first place use the 
balancing technique between private rights and collective aims. And contrary to the cautious attitude 
of the WTO dispute settlement bodies, investment tribunals do not seem to hesitate in referring to a 
‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed on the foreign 
investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure’74. The list of awards which 
abundantly use the balancing technique has started with the Tecmed v Mexico case but is now long 
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enough not to be detailed
75
. Many of these awards resort to the proportionality analysis while at the 
same time relying explicitly on the case law of the ECtHR. The Tecmed v Mexico
76
 and Azurix v 
Argentina
77
 are just examples amongst many others. While the Azurix Tribunal quotes quite 
extensively from the James and others v UK judgment of the ECtHR
78
, it does avoid any reference to 
the NMA doctrine which is yet one of the main features of that judgment. As for the Tecmed tribunal, 
the use of the language of the ECtHR referring to the ‘reasonable relationship’ is somewhat 
misleading. Indeed, instead of the NMA doctrine which usually softens the proportionality analysis in 
favour of the State, the Tribunal only mentions the ‘due deference’ in asserting that it does not prevent 
it from reviewing the proportionality of the contested measure
79
. It then proceeds to an appraisal of 
proportionality of the measure without leaving much room for the State’s margin of appreciation. This 
is worth noting because it seems to have partially borrowed the language of the ECtHR while at the 
same time avoiding an explicit reference to the margin of appreciation. In other words, it borrows the 
proportionality analysis to which it refers as a ‘reasonable relationship’ but not the tool that the ECtHR 
uses to soften that rather stringent test. It therefore only pays lip service to the ECtHR’s methodology.  
As for the phrase ‘margin of appreciation’ itself, it is quite often invoked by responding States80 as 
well as by expert opinions
81
 to argue for some deference towards State action. However, this does not 
necessarily correspond to the NMA doctrine but rather to the concept of margin of appreciation. That 
is the case for instance in the opinion of Sir Christopher Greenwood according to whom in matters of 
denial of justice, ‘international law allows a broad margin of discretion to each State in the way it 
organizes its legal system'
82
. This is not however exactly a reference to the doctrine since it is tied 
neither to the necessity test nor to the use of State discretion in the context of the appraisal of an 
allegedly expropriatory measure.  
No investor-State tribunal seems to have resorted to the NMA doctrine as it functions within the 
ECtHR case law. In Siemens A.G. v the Argentine Republic the tribunal dismissed the doctrine because 
it was ‘not found in customary international law or the Treaty’83. In doing so it implies that the 
doctrine is provided for in Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECtHR. It thus omits the important precision 
that the NMA is a judge-made construct which was not initially provided for by the Convention and 
which is therefore potentially available to investor-state tribunals as long as they apply similar rules to 
those of the ECHR.  
In the Continental Casualty v Argentina case, the tribunal adopted the same methodology as the 
WTO dispute settlement bodies in examining the criterion of necessity in the context of Article XI of 
the previously mentioned BIT which allowed the host State to take the necessary measures to protect 
public order. However, it is somewhat confusing that the Tribunal borrows techniques both from the 
WTO and the ECtHR: while referring to the NMA doctrine
84
, it also undergoes a detailed and 
relatively intrusive least restrictive alternative measure which is not, as it was seen above, 
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characteristic of the ECtHR methodology
85
. However, the standard applied by the Tribunal is more 
consistent than it may seem. Whereas the application of the LRM test can be easily accounted for by 
the chairmanship of a former member of the WTO Appellate Body, Professor Giorgio Sacerdoti, the 
reference to the NMA seems to be nothing more than paying lip service to Argentina’s pleadings 
which relied on the case law of the ECtHR. Indeed, the NMA is mentioned not at the stage of the 
assessment of necessity as is usually the case in ECtHR case law but at the previous stage of 
determining whether the measure at stake is a ‘public order’ or ‘national security’ measure. Therefore, 
the doctrine is appealed to only to check whether the measure is an appropriate one. This stage is not 
the one that is decisive neither in the ECtHR case law, nor in the WTO reports. The vast majority of 
the cases pass this test and it is rather uncommon that the Court or the WTO DSB declare that a given 
measure is not suitable to achieving the set legitimate objective.  
Although some scholars may point to other cases as notable cases of use of the NMA doctrine, it 
must be stressed again that the mere use of the words ‘margin of appreciation’86 or ‘margin of 
discretion’87 does not, in itself, amount to the use of the NMA doctrine. In Micula, although the 
Tribunal uses inverted comas, perhaps so as to signify that it is borrowing the concept from elsewhere, 
it only said that ‘the State conferring nationality must be given a “margin of appreciation” in deciding 
upon the factors that it considers necessary for the granting of nationality’88. In doing so, it relies not 
on the doctrine of the ECtHR but on the one single case of the IACHR which uses the wording 
‘margin of appreciation’, ie the advisory opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization 
Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica
89
. As will be seen, the IACtHR resorted in that 
case to the concept of margin of appreciation, and not to the doctrine. The State’s wide leeway in 
determining the conditions for granting its nationality does not have anything to do with the NMA 
doctrine that the ECtHR uses in some cases in which it has to balance individual rights with collective 
goals in the context of the necessity test.  
The Saluka award may be seen as bearing more resemblance with the ECtHR methodology on the 
NMA doctrine because it applies, in respect to the rule on prohibition of deprivation of property, a 
lenient test to assess the action of the national authorities. This is notwithstanding that the Tribunal 
does not refer to the case law of the ECtHR. However, unless one considers that any standard of 
review that is favourable to State authorities amounts to an application of the NMA doctrine, it may be 
doubted that the methodology adopted by the Tribunal is borrowed from the case law of the ECtHR. 
Indeed, while it is true that the Tribunal recognizes a ‘margin of discretion’ to the Czech banking 
regulator in deciding to impose a forced administration to an entity
90
, it does not really balance a 
legitimate objective with the effect of the restrictive measure on the investor. In this particular case the 
Tribunal adopts a test which is even more favourable than the NMA doctrine in that it only controls 
the ‘reasonableness’ – in the English law meaning of the word – of the appraisal made by the national 
authority. This is different from the ‘reasonable relationship’ that must be established between the aim 
pursued and the restrictive measure according to the ECtHR.  
One must therefore conclude from the examined case law that although some arbitral tribunals may 
use the wording of the ECtHR, this does not imply that the NMA doctrine has been imported into 
investment law. And yet, recourse to the proportionality analysis by investment tribunals may allow 
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for some evolution in the near future. However, the political nature of the NMA doctrine may still 
account for a persistent reluctance similar to that observed in the WTO case law.  
III. Accounting for an absence  
How is it that neither the WTO dispute settlement bodies nor the investment tribunals borrow the 
NMA doctrine while the applicable rules are comparable to those applied by the ECtHR ? This fact 
situation can be accounted for by looking at the differences between the ECtHR system on the one 
hand and the WTO and investment dispute settlement bodies on the other hand. These differences are 
both structural and political.  
A. Structural differences  
The NMA doctrine within the ECtHR case law is part of a system. It is the counterpart to the judicial 
activism which is so characteristic of the ECtHR, not only through the proportionality analysis but also 
through other judicial techniques such as the evolutive interpretation and the principle of effectiveness. 
Three factors can be identified which could account for the absence of the NMA doctrine.  
1) The absence of other related principles  
Although there are similarities, there are irreducible differences between international, and particularly 
European, human rights law, and international economic law.  
The first of those is the absence of the principle of subsidiarity in international economic law. The 
NMA doctrine has developed alongside with the principle of subsidiarity. It appears from the case law, 
and particularly from the very structure of the Handyside judgment
91
, that it is derived from this 
underlying principle. Indeed, according to the ECtHR, the rationale of the NMA is that of a ‘functional 
necessity’ according to which the Convention must be the lowest common denominator among the 
Member States
92
. This means that it is primarily for the national judges to protect fundamental rights 
and in that regard they may take further that ‘lowest common denominator’. Therefore, the NMA 
doctrine appears as a tool designed to apply the principle of subsidiarity
93
.  
Is there any room for a similar principle of subsidiarity which could give rise to the NMA doctrine 
within international economic law? The texts and the case law do not give any hints in that direction. 
One could nonetheless try to answer the question in an indirect way. The principle of subsidiarity 
entails that national authorities (governments, legislatures and courts) of Member States have the 
primary responsibility for guaranteeing and protecting human rights at a national level. The 
supervisory mechanisms established by the Convention have a subsidiary nature. The Court being the 
judicial supervisory mechanism, its subsidiary role entails that there be at the national level judges 
who will have the primary responsibility to guarantee the protection of human rights. Indeed, for the 
international judge to act only in a subsidiary manner in relation to a given international norm, the 
national judge must, in the first place, have jurisdiction and be empowered to enforce that same legal 
norm. While the same international norm can also be enshrined in national acts, and thus be enforced 
as a national norm, the direct applicability of international law is very useful for the principle of 
subsidiarity, at least in the monist legal systems, where it is applicable. And that is where the limits of 
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the comparison between human rights law and international economic law appear: whereas national 
judges apply the ECtHR law as directly applicable international law in many Member States
94
, they 
seem not to be empowered to review the enforcement of WTO law and international investment law. 
Indeed, despite ‘fierce academic debate’ and some variations from one national legal system to 
another, WTO law norms are not generally directly applicable
95
. Equally, and although this is less 
widely debated, international investment treaties do not either seem to be directly applicable
96
. While 
this may certainly be mitigated by the fact that the direct effect theory is only applicable to monist 
systems, it however contributes to the argument that WTO dispute settlement bodies, as well as the 
investor-State tribunals, appear as primary, and not subsidiary, judges. Therefore, the first, and 
functional, basis of the NMA doctrine within the ECtHR does not seem to have an equivalent in 
international economic law.  
A second important difference lies in the interpretive system relied on by the compared judicial 
bodies. Indeed, the NMA doctrine is an interpretive technique which must be put in the context of 
other interpretive methods that make the ‘interpretive system’ of the ECtHR as a principled set of rules 
which are articulated and sometimes balanced against each other. Thus, the subsidiarity principle has a 
counterpart which is not found in the two examined fields of international economic law: the principle 
of effectiveness. Indeed, just as subsidiarity founds the NMA doctrine, the principle of effectiveness 
founds another focal interpretive method within the ECHR system: the evolutive interpretation. It is 
thus in the name of an effective protection of individual rights that the ECtHR has been able to extend 
the applicable rules to many situations that were not initially provided for by the Member States of the 
Convention. But the idea of an effective protection going beyond what is explicitly provided for in the 
text does not seem to play a role in investment law nor in WTO law. Unsurprisingly, the evolutive 
interpretation doctrine as it exists within the ECtHR case law cannot be found in international 
economic law
97
. Whereas the discussion over dynamic interpretation of the BITs has not yet arisen 
within international investment law, the issues of the debate regarding the WTO agreements must be 
clarified and distinguished from those of the ECtHR case law. There has indeed been some academic 
discussion over the dynamic interpretation by the WTO dispute settlement bodies
98
. It is true that in 
the United States – Turtle/Shrimp report the AB used an interpretive method which was very close to 
the dynamic interpretation of the ECtHR. It referred to international legal instruments that were not 
binding on the parties as well as to international non-legal instruments such as Agenda 21 in 
interpreting the terms ‘exhaustible natural resources’99. With hindsight, and mutatis mutandis, its 
approach in that case is very similar to that of the ECtHR in the Demir and Baykara v Turkey 
judgment which is a clear case of evolutive interpretation applied to the freedom of association of 
Article 11 of the Convention. In both cases, the international adjudicator takes into account 
international law that is not binding on the party as well as soft law that is not binding at all. However, 
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beyond that specific and isolated case, it does not seem that the WTO bodies resort to the evolutive 
interpretation as used by the ECtHR. In subsequent case law, the WTO dispute settlement bodies only 
take into account in their interpretive effort international obligations actually binding on the parties. In 
the EC – Biotech Products report, the Panel goes even further in requiring that for another 
international instrument to be referred at, it must bind not only the parties to the dispute but also all the 
parties to the WTO
100
. This is very different from the evolutive interpretation of the ECtHR the 
purpose of which is to take into account not only law that is binding on the respondent party but also 
any soft law or social facts within its well-known ‘present-day conditions’ criterion. To clarify the 
meaning of a legal provision, the judge refers, on the one hand to other legal rules which are 
applicable to the parties, on the other hand to ‘simple’ facts that have not been turned into law. The 
role of the judge is therefore not exactly the same in the instances. The ECtHR acts as a ‘constitutional 
judge’ – or even as a legislator – in assessing social facts which are usually at the discretion of the 
national legislator. In the SAS v France judgment it explicitly recognizes that it ‘had a duty to exercise 
a degree of restraint in its review of Convention compliance, since such review led it to assess a 
balance that had been struck by means of a democratic process within the society in question’101. In 
thus justifying the use of the NMA doctrine in this specific case, the Court implicitly recognizes its 
judicial activism in other cases where the debate concerning the democratic process is not so weighty.  
Thus, whereas one could regret the fact that international economic law adjudicators do not resort 
to the NMA doctrine, it has to be underlined that they do not use other tools of the ECtHR which are 
usually seen as restrictive of State sovereignty. The systems at issue are irreducibly different in spite 
of both being international legal systems. This does not necessarily aim at fitting within the theory of 
fragmentation of international law but it definitely runs counter to the idea that there is a tendency 
towards harmonization of the international law techniques resulting from the different courts and 
tribunals imitating each other. There are structural differences between the different legal systems
102
.  
2) Different actors  
It may be interesting to account for the difference in the use of the NMA doctrine in the fields of 
human rights and international economic law by looking at the legal nature of the parties in a dispute: 
in WTO law, as well as in international investment law, what is at stake are rights of foreign economic 
actors, be they ‘represented’ by their State, as in the WTO law, or not, as in investor-State arbitration. 
So, in the case of the WTO, recognizing a NMA to the responding State is somehow restricting the 
protection that is granted to the complaining State. Whereas the ECtHR system is an objective system 
of protection of individuals, the WTO law is a subjective system of synallagmatic obligations that 
Member States owe to each other. Both the applicant and the defendant are sovereign and deserve a 
‘neutral’ application of the law. This is nothing else than an application of a basic principle of 
international law, ie the principle of equality of States. In human rights adjudication, applying the 
NMA doctrine amounts to restricting not another sovereign’s rights but an individual’s rights. And, 
however disappointing that may be, it seems easier for an international adjudicator to restrict an 
individual’s rights than a State’s rights, at least regarding international human rights law. 
The NMA is not only about the relationship between an international adjudicator and a responding 
State but also and above all about the relationship between an applicant and a respondent. Whereas it 
is easy to see the difference between an international human rights system and the WTO system, it 
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may prove more difficult to account for the lack of the NMA doctrine in investor-state arbitration 
where the applicant is not another sovereign State but a private actor, just as the applicant before the 
ECtHR. Theoretically, the explanation of the absence of the NMA doctrine through the nature of the 
actors should hold for WTO case law but not for investor-State arbitration. In investment law, we are 
exactly in the same position as in human rights law: on the one hand, a private individual whose 
protection is guaranteed by an international treaty against a sovereign State, on the other hand, a 
sovereign State who has public policy obligations overriding in some cases the protection of private 
interests. And yet, the NMA doctrine, as a doctrine which favours the police powers of the State in 
some cases, does not seem to be welcomed. Is it because the investor is heightened to the status of a 
State and thus the arbitral tribunals take the same precautions as they would with a State? Is it because 
behind the investor hides his State of nationality
103
? Whatever the reasons for the reluctance in fact of 
investment arbitrators to show any deference to State sovereignty, it must be underlined that, from a 
theoretical point of view, the investor-State arbitration system is in a different position than the WTO 
adjudication system.  
Therefore, if we set aside the differences as to the underlying principles such as the subsidiarity 
principle, it may be suggested that the investor-State arbitration is more likely than the WTO system to 
welcome the NMA doctrine throughout its case law in the future. This is all the more so as investment 
tribunals have already adopted a proportionality analysis similar to that of the ECtHR. The resistance 
may therefore be purely political, rather than structural. 
B. Political contingencies 
What does the doctrine of NMA have in common with the Monroe, Hallstein, Brezhnev, Stimson
104
 or 
even the Calvo doctrines? On the face of it, not much. Whereas the former is a judicial construct, the 
latter are the result of both official statements and state practice. Besides, whereas the latter are used to 
‘announce [State] political or strategic interest or intention’, a judicial body, as a neutral law-
enforcement body, is not supposed to have any political or strategic interests or intentions. Also, it 
seems that the word ‘doctrine’ is ‘an opinion emanating from politicians on controversial points of 
international law which are to be used as a basis for their government’s conduct’105. And yet, it 
appears that it is not by chance that the technique of the NMA used by the ECtHR has soon been 
coined ‘doctrine’, rather than principle, concept or notion. Although the Court itself does not use the 
word ‘doctrine’ which seems to have been coined by scholars, this choice reveals an intent – which is 
not explicitly stated though – on behalf of the Court to be deferent towards the defendant State’s 
regulatory choices. In other words, besides the functional rationale derived from the principle of 
subsidiarity, the doctrine also responds to an ideological requirement, that of the deference due to each 
Member State’s sovereignty.  
It is thus argued that even though the situation of the different adjudicators at stake were exactly 
the same and the structural differences between the compared systems reduced, there would still 
remain an element which could explain why investment tribunals and WTO dispute settlement bodies 
do not follow the practice of the ECtHR, that is the political nature of the NMA doctrine. 
Notwithstanding that we have set it in its legal context, the NMA doctrine itself is not a systematic 
mechanism. Therefore it cannot be transposed, even if the structural conditions were to be exactly the 
same as in the ECtHR, without a political intent and an ideological requirement.  
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Just as the idea of deference it conveys, the NMA doctrine does not seem to have any normative 
meaning
106
. Its meaning is mainly political. It is therefore more of a political than a legal concept. And 
that can be illustrated by the cases in which the Court proceeds to quite a rigorous balancing of the 
different factors within the necessity test and where it nonetheless refers to the Member State’s margin 
of appreciation to conclude that there was no violation of the Convention. A concurring opinion of a 
judge has rightly pointed that out
107
. One may wonder if the Court could not come to exactly the same 
conclusion without referring to the margin of appreciation. The NMA doctrine therefore appears as a 
political banner by which judges not only show deference, but want to be seen as showing deference. 
Rather than a sound standard of review, it is a tool of political deference.  
Indeed, the decision to resort to the doctrine in cases of normative flexibility is clearly a choice that 
is offered to an adjudicating body. And that choice is not determined by the law. Does that mean that 
the NMA doctrine is not submitted to any legal criteria within the ECtHR case law? In fact, faced with 
the skepticism of the opponents to the doctrine, the European judge has early on developed a 
methodology which includes several legal criteria among which the most famous one is the European 
consensus
108
. However, these judge-made but legal criteria which still provide the judge with 
normative flexibility act on a case by case basis. They do not account for the initial decision of the 
judge to introduce the doctrine in its case law, no matter to what precise cases it will apply it. It is that 
initial decision which is founded on political considerations rather than determined by legal 
considerations. The fact that some Member States have recently felt the need to add the doctrine 
within the text of the Convention confirms the idea that the initial introduction was not legal but 
political. Therefore, ‘political’ has to be understood as opposed to anything that is inherent to the 
nature of the applicable law. The doctrine has been founded on extra-legal factors such as the need to 
manage State sovereignty and national communities’ susceptibilities.  
Indeed, it could be assumed that the IACtHR which proceeds to a similar balancing between 
individual rights and collective interests also uses the NMA doctrine. However, and notwithstanding 
the assertions of some scholars
109
, it seems that even this other regional human rights judge does not, 
for reasons which have nothing to do with the nature of the obligations binding upon the States, ie 
reasons which are more of a political than of a legal kind. Indeed, whereas the literature tends to rely 
mainly on the same case, i.e. the advisory opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization 
Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica
110
, it is doubtful that the Court really uses the 
doctrine, even though its terminology may evoke in certain cases the concept of margin of 
appreciation
111
. It is significant that the IACtHR uses similar legal tools to those used by the ECtHR, 
be it the proportionality principle or the evolutive interpretation, but is not yet ready to borrow the 
NMA doctrine in spite of frequent pleadings in that sense by the responding States. The reasons for the 
IACtHR’s reluctance are not legal or structural but political, the Court considering that the Inter-
American system of protection of human rights is not mature enough for it to loosen its control
112
, 
some judges even considering that such a doctrine would be ‘dangerous’ for the protection of human 
rights in American States
113
.  
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Therefore, the absence of the NMA doctrine in international economic law must also be attributed 
to a political reluctance on behalf of the adjudicating bodies to follow the path of the ECtHR. It is true 
that some investment tribunals may be tempted to borrow, mainly for legitimacy purposes, from the 
ECtHR the concept of margin of appreciation. This phenomenon must however be distinguished from 
a genuine political willingness to leave a certain leeway to the host State. As for the WTO, it is more 
obvious and straightforward that its dispute settlement bodies do not try to borrow the ECtHR 
methodology. In an era where international tribunals tend to quote each other as much as possible, it is 
worth noting that in spite of having a necessity test which is quite comparable to the one of the 
ECtHR, the WTO dispute settlement bodies hardly ever quote the case law of the ECtHR. In fact, their 
caution is such that they seem even to avoid using the concept of ‘margin of appreciation’ within the 
context of the necessity test, let alone the doctrine. There is therefore a political weariness in that 
regard.  
If we recall that they are tandem principles, it may be observed that while proportionality analysis 
is sometimes criticized for ‘de-politicizing’ and ‘de-moralizing’ the ‘rights discourse’114, it may be 
said that NMA repoliticizes any field it enters. So, considering the introduction of the NMA doctrine 
in an area of law is also considering politicizing or re-politicizing that area. Indeed, whenever it uses 
the NMA doctrine, the ECtHR implicitly admits being a political stage or at least being an 
international tribunal where national policy considerations can be taken into account. Hence that the 
discourse about introducing NMA into international investment’s law is highly political. This is 
consistent with the ‘re-politization’ discourse, and beyond, with the ‘public interest’ literature which 
calls for no less than a recognition of the political sensitivity of the interests at stake. And that claim is 
legitimate enough since other courts and tribunals take into account, without expressly admitting it, the 
political sensitivity of certain issues.  
A final hypothesis may be drawn which could account for the political reluctance of international 
economic law dispute settlement bodies towards the NMA doctrine. The authority an international 
tribunal has over its Member States may also be a factor accounting for the decision to introduce the 
NMA doctrine. Hence, whereas the ECtHR has been faced with many political crises in which one 
Member State or another threatens that it will take measures against the supranational body, or more 
simply that it will not apply its decisions
115
, it seems that there has not been any such reactions on 
behalf of the Member States who ‘lose’ before the WTO bodies. Therefore these bodies do not feel the 
need to show deference towards their Member States. Or at least there are other forms of deference 
which are explicitly provided for by the agreements such as in the anti-dumping Agreement of the 
WTO. As for the international investment tribunals, there seems to be sufficient debate today for the 
arbitrators to consider the usefulness of such a tool where more and more States question the 
legitimacy of this type of dispute settlement mechanism.  
Conclusion 
It appears that the NMA doctrine as understood in this paper is ill-adapted to the WTO dispute 
settlement system not only because of the characteristics of the system, but also because the 
adjudicators generally dismiss anything that could suggest that they are responsible for balancing trade 
with other values. Hence, as long as such a proportionality analysis is not admitted, there is little 
chance that the NMA doctrine be ever invoked within the WTO. The situation of the investor-State 
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arbitration is different and there could theoretically be more room for NMA doctrine. But the 
necessary political mindset does not seem to be present within the arbitrators’ community for now. 
Foreign investors go to investment tribunals instead of national tribunals to avoid any imbalance in 
favour of the State and to ‘de-politicize’ the dispute. Although highly desirable in certain politically 
sensitive cases such as the Argentinean ones, the introduction of the NMA doctrine would appear as 
favouring the responding State. However, the borrowing of the proportionality analysis from the 
ECtHR may be seen as a first step towards a future NMA doctrine within investor-State arbitration.  
Beyond that, the issue of the generalization of the NMA doctrine in international adjudication must 
be approached with much caution. It is true that the often-hailed flag of ‘fragmentation’ of the 
international system may lead to efforts to harmonize the methods of international tribunals looking 
for ‘lowest common denominators’. However, given the diversity of the systems and their functioning, 
as well as the unique political status of each of these tribunals which have not been created at the same 
time nor in the same political and legal conditions, methods can certainly be compared but tools not 
necessarily exported. Thus, the NMA doctrine is very specific to the ECtHR and cannot be exported 
although there are obvious similarities in the reasoning. It could however be a useful tool if investor-
State arbitrations were to be further questioned by civil society and host-States.  
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